



A-level
PHILOSOPHY
7172/2

Paper 2 The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

Mark scheme

June 2021

Version: 1.0 Final Mark Scheme



2 1 6 A 7 1 7 2 / 2 / M S

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A

The Metaphysics of God

0 1 What does it mean to say that a person’s religious claim is unfalsifiable?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Indicative content for 3 marks:

- There are **no** possible states of affairs that would “count against the assertion, or which would induce the speaker to withdraw it and to admit that it had been mistaken” (which s/he “would regard as counting against, or as being incompatible with, its truth”).
- Whatever evidence is or could possibly be presented, the person would continue to make the religious claim (either by denying the evidence, or by claiming that the evidence is compatible with their claim).
- A religious claim/assertion (e.g. ‘God exists’) is unfalsifiable (and therefore meaningless) if there are no circumstances whereby the person making the claim would concede that there was evidence to disprove (or even undermine) this claim.

NB: In order to score full marks, the student’s response must 1) appreciation that this question is concerned with the status of religious language (e.g. references to ‘statements’, ‘assertions’, or ‘claims’ as is the question, rather than about ‘beliefs’ or ‘arguments’; and 2) that the claim (or individual making a claim) does not acknowledge any conditions whereby that claim would be falsified.

Indicative content for 2 marks:

- When there are no circumstances when a religious believer would admit that there could be any evidence which would show their belief to be false.
- When a religious claim ‘dies the death of a thousand qualifications’ and is therefore meaningless.

Indicative content for 1 mark:

- A religious claim is meaningless (or not a real assertion) because it is unfalsifiable.
- A claim which dies the death of a thousand qualifications.

For reference, here is a section from the relevant text where Flew describes the conditions under which a claim would be falsifiable; if it does not meet these conditions it would count as unfalsifiable:

“Now to assert that such and such is the case is necessarily equivalent to denying that such and such is not the case. Suppose then that we are in doubt as to what someone who gives vent to an utterance is asserting, or suppose that, more radically, we are sceptical as to whether he is really asserting anything at all, one way of trying to understand (or perhaps it will be to expose) his utterance is to attempt to find what he would regard as counting against, or as being incompatible with, its truth. For if an utterance is indeed an assertion, it will necessarily be equivalent to a denial of the negation of that assertion. And anything which would count against the assertion, or which would induce the speaker to withdraw it and to admit that it had been mistaken, must be part of (or the whole of) the meaning of the negation of that assertion: And to know the meaning of the negation of an assertion, is as near as makes no matter, to know the meaning of that assertion. And if there is nothing which a putative assertion denies then there is nothing which it asserts either: and so it is not really an assertion.”

(Flew, ‘Theology and Falsification’)

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 2 Outline Aquinas' 1st Way (the argument from motion).

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- As background and for context, students may state that it is (a) an argument for God's existence; (b) a cosmological argument; (c) an a posteriori argument; (d) a deductive argument; (d) an argument with a 'reductio ad absurdum' form.
- It is important for students to note that Aquinas is using the term "motion" differently to the way it is normally understood.
- 'Motion' is not motion through space, but rather how something changes from 'potentially' X to 'actually' X.
- Change can only be brought about by what is actual
- *"that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it."*
- Here's the argument in standard form:
 - P1: The universe contains motion (ie change from potentially X to actually X)
 - P2: Nothing can move/change itself (nothing can actualise its own potential) - it must be moved/changed by something distinct from it (*"It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, ie that it should move itself."*)
 - P3: If there were an infinite series of such secondary movers/changers (ie movers/changers moved/changed by other movers/changers) then there would be no first mover/changer.
 - P4: If there were no first mover/changer there could not be any motion/change - since if you remove the cause, you cannot have the effect (some particular motion/change wouldn't occur if infinite other motion/changes needed to happen in order for it to happen)
 - C1: Therefore, given P1 (ie that there is motion/change) there must be a first mover/changer
 - P5: God is this first mover/changer (God is "pure actuality"/actus purus).
 - C2: Therefore God exists

For reference here is the relevant section:

"It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to

*actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, ie. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God” (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part I, Question 2, Article 3).*

0 3 Explain the argument that the existence of an omniscient God is incompatible with free human beings.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Students will likely explain what is meant by God being omniscient. This could be explained in one or more of the following ways:
 - God knows all true propositions
 - God knows everything that it is possible to know
 - God knows everything that it is possible for a being of his nature to know
 - one of the claims above + God believes no false propositions
 - for all propositions, God knows whether they are true or false
 - some might include non-propositional knowledge (ie capacity and acquaintance knowledge).
- According to this argument, if an omniscient God exists then free human beings cannot possibly exist: God's infallible knowledge is incompatible with humans making free choices.
- This may also be expressed as a conflict that arises when combining God's omniscience with God's supreme goodness, if it is assumed that a good God would give human beings free will.
- Students are likely to equate free will with a human's counter-factual ability to have done otherwise than what they do (this is what has been used for the example argument below). This said, there are many accounts of free will that have been given and could be employed in relation to this question but it is impossible in this mark scheme to deal with all such possibilities.
- The argument in outline is that if God knows every proposition concerning my future, then, since knowledge is factive, God knows all the truths about my future and so for any such true proposition *p*, I am powerless to have made it false that *p*, or to have done other than I will do, in which case I am not free. The argument can be presented with greater and lesser precision/detail than the version below and can be presented in other formats (e.g. it may not be presented with a conditional first premise and a conditional conclusion).
 - P1: God is omniscient if and only if God knows all true propositions.
 - P2: There are true propositions about the future.
 - P3: God is omniscient only if God knows all true future propositions (from 1,2).
 - P4: If God knows all true future propositions, including those about my future actions, then it is impossible for those propositions about my future actions to be false.

- P5: If it is impossible for those propositions about my future actions to be false, then it is impossible for me to do otherwise than the action specified in those propositions, and so I am not free.
- C: Therefore, if God is omniscient, I am not free.
- It is trivially true that if God decides the future, and no-one can prevent God from carrying out these decisions, then God knows the future. However, if students merely put this in terms of God deciding our future without reference to his knowledge then this misses the point of the question somewhat: this is not a question about predestination but rather is about God's omniscience.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 4 Outline the logical problem of evil **and** explain the Free Will Defence.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- The logical problem of evil is the argument that God’s omnipotence, and supreme goodness and the existence of evil are logically inconsistent. (Some students might add omniscience to this in order to reach an inconsistency – see square-bracketed section below)
- Here is one way of presenting the logical problem of evil as an argument in standard form:
 - P1: If God exists, then God is omnipotent.
 - P2: An omnipotent being would be able to prevent/eliminate evil.
 - P3: If God exists then God is wholly good (omnibenevolent).
 - P4: A wholly good being would be opposed to evil and so would prevent/eliminate evil as far as it could.
 - *[P5: If God exists then God is omniscient.*
 - *[P6: An omniscient being would know that evil exists and/or that it is about to come into existence.]*
 - P7: Therefore, if God exists then evil would not (and could not) exist.
 - P8: Evil exists.
 - C: Therefore, God does not exist.
 - *(Some student may put the issue without mentioning omniscience (the premises in square brackets above) and this is fine).*

- The Free Will Defence addresses this problem by arguing that the ‘gift’ of free will is worth the consequent unavoidable risk of moral evil that may result from it (ie that P4 above is false).
- Moral evil is therefore our fault, rather than God’s.
- The general argument is as follows but (a) many parts of this may be expanded upon in various ways and (b) there are many other reasonable ways of phrasing this argument:
 - P1: A world containing (morally) significantly free creatures is better than a world without such creatures (and better than no world at all).
 - C1: Therefore, if God creates a world, then it must be a world with (morally) significantly free creatures.
 - P2: If a world contains significantly free creatures [or creatures with morally significant freedom], then moral evil is possible in that world.
 - C2: Therefore, if God creates a world with significantly free creatures [or creatures with morally significant freedom] ,then it must be a world in which moral evil is possible.
 - [C3: Therefore, the existence of moral evil is logically compatible with the existence of God.]

Notes:

- Students may include reference to Plantinga’s concept of ‘transworld depravity’ though this is not required for full marks to be awarded.
- Students may discuss the evil caused by the free choices made by supernatural beings (angels/ the Devil). They may relate this to physical/natural evil (arguing that even so-called ‘physical/natural evil’ is in fact moral evil).
- Do not penalise students who omit omniscience in their articulation of the problem of evil.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 5 Can God's existence be proved using an ontological argument?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Conclusions may include:
 - at least one version of the ontological argument proves (conclusively) that God exists
 - all versions of the ontological argument discussed in the students answer fail to prove (conclusively) that God exists
 - the ontological argument does not *prove* the existence of God, but demonstrates the rationality of theistic belief for those committed to the truth of the premises (argued by, e.g., Plantinga)
- Ontological arguments are a priori arguments for the existence of God (in the sense that all of the premises involved are themselves a priori). They are advanced as deductive arguments, intended to yield true (and certain) conclusions given the truth of the premises.
- Students may define God as a ‘supremely perfect’ or ‘maximally great being’ (omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good and eternal or everlasting etc; or possibly maximally powerful, maximally good...etc). This might depend on which argument(s) they are considering.
- In terms of the types of ontological arguments that might be discussed, students will likely draw from definitional, conceptual, and modal versions. There are other versions, however, including ‘experiential’ and so called ‘higher order’ arguments, though it is unlikely they will be utilised.

NB:

- There is no overwhelming philosophical consensus on the way different ontological arguments should be classified (even famous ones), and it is recognised that certain arguments can have features of different types. The emphasis should be on the details of particular arguments rather than the type they might be said to belong to.
- Ontological arguments are distinct from arguments like Descartes’ trademark argument, which are related to the (causal) *origin* of the concept of God (although Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas is relevant to both his trademark argument *and* his ontological argument, see below for details).

Students may discuss one or more of the following ontological arguments (with some possible objections offered below each):

Anselm’s argument (a typical interpretation):

- This argument functions as a *reductio ad absurdum* of atheism, the “fool who says in his heart there is no God”; taking the idea of God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”; claiming that a being that exists in reality is greater than a being that exists in the mind alone; recognising the absurdity of conceiving of a being greater than which nothing can be conceived; and concluding that a being greater than which nothing can be conceived must exist.
 - Expect critical responses to come from Gaunilo’s “lost island”/“most perfect island” argument. This has spawned a host of parodies of ontological arguments, whereby parallel arguments are constructed so as to (attempt to) mirror the logic of ontological arguments, delivering either

absurd conclusions or conclusions which are antithetical to theism (e.g. arguments concluding that God cannot exist).

- Although Aquinas wasn't responding to Anselm directly, students may discuss his influential objection to *a priori* arguments for the existence of God: what people understand by "God" may differ, and we do not have enough understanding of the "essence of God" for it to be either self-evident that God exists, nor for us to demonstrate God's existence from premises drawn from reflection on the divine nature.
- Although Kant's "existence (or being) is not a real predicate" objection was aimed at Cartesian ontological arguments at the time of its composition (see below), it has been used against Anselm too.

NB: Some 20th century interpreters of Anselm (eg. Malcolm, Plantinga, and Anscombe) have rejected the relevance of Kant's classic objection to Anselm's version. It has been argued (from the *Proslogion* and Anselm's reply to Gaunilo) that he never intended "existence" to function as a "predicate" (or "perfection") when arguing for God's existence; he intended "*necessary existence*" to function as a "predicate" or "perfection", which he (reasonably) understood as a "great making property".

Descartes' argument (a typical presentation):

- P1: My (or the) idea of God is an idea of a supremely perfect being; P2: A supremely perfect being has all perfections; P3: Existence is a perfection; C: Therefore, God must (necessarily) exist.
- At times Descartes seems to treat this not as an (extended deductive) argument but instead as a self-evident intuition: it starts with an innate concept of God that we may attend to or discover within our minds (expect analogies of triangles and mountains/valleys).
 - Expect critical responses to be drawn from Hume, who argued that nothing necessarily exists, and no synthetic claims can be demonstrated *a priori*.
 - Kant argued that "existence/being" cannot be considered "a (real) predicate". Descartes' argument is especially vulnerable to this objection when he is interpreted as advancing an argument of the definitional variety, where "existence" appears in a list of "perfections" Descartes insists on using to define God (but one need not be committed to this understanding of Descartes).
 - Kant also argues that if one accepts the definition of a triangle, then, necessarily, if a triangle exists it has three sides but this is conditional not absolute necessity; similarly, one can accept that if God exists, God exists necessarily but this again at most establishes the conditional claim.
 - Leibniz argued that there is a missing (or suppressed) premise in Descartes's presentation of the argument (see next point).

Leibniz's extension of / improvement to Descartes' argument:

- Leibniz added what he saw as crucial additional premise (that the concept of God must be coherent), and he offered an argument in support of this premise (that it is coherent because perfections are simple and unanalysable, so they cannot contradict each other).
 - Responses might take the form of an attack on Leibniz's claim that there can be qualities that are simple and unanalysable.
 - The coherence of the concept of God may be challenged: alleged contradictions between God's traditional attributes/perfections, or between God's attributes/perfections and other knowledge (or intuitions) we may have about the world.

Malcolm's (modal) argument (a modern restatement/reinterpretation of Anselm):

- God is conceived as an absolutely unlimited being (this excludes contingent beings); the existence of an absolutely unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible (because of some internal contradiction in its properties); there is no contradiction in this idea of God, so God's existence is not impossible; therefore God's existence is necessary.
 - Responses may centre on Malcolm's narrow understanding of what a contradiction amounts to and point to his failure to provide any explicit defence of the coherence of the idea of God (conceived as "absolutely unlimited being"), and that coherence might indeed be challenged (see previous points).
 - It might be objected that Malcolm's argument fails through a fallacy of equivocation because he confuses *logical necessity* (truth in all possible worlds) with what Hick calls *ontological necessity*, where an ontologically necessary being is not dependent on anything else for its existence.

Plantinga's (modal) argument:

- Plantinga understands God as a "maximally great being" (with all "great making properties": omnipotence, omniscience, supreme goodness etc); this being exists in one possible world (the concept of a "maximally great being" is logically consistent/coherent); but for a being to be "maximally great" it would have to exist with all its "great making" properties in every possible world; since such a being exists in at least one possible world, it must therefore exist in every possible world.
 - Some respondents to Plantinga have questioned the principle of modal logic underlying the argument that "if a maximally great being" exists in one possible world then such a being "must exist in every possible world."
 - More likely, students' responses will revolve around either (a) whether the existence of a "maximally great being" is possible (again, doubts about the coherence of the idea may be raised) or (b) parodies/overload: one could define a maximally evil being into existence the same way.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B

The Metaphysics of Mind

0 | 6 What does functionalism claim about mental states?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Indicative content for 3 marks

- “All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised” (AQA specification).
 - Mental states are not to be analysed in terms of their ontology (what they are made) but the functional role that they play within a system of inputs and outputs.
 - Mental states are defined by the computational (machine functionalism) or causal (causal-role functionalism) relations they bear to inputs (environmental inputs), output (behaviours) and other mental states.
 - Mental states are machine states specified causally in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table. (Machine functionalism).
 - Mental states are the entities postulated by the best scientific explanation of human behaviour and are specified causally in terms of the functional roles they play in producing the behaviour to be explained. (Psycho-functionalism).
 - All statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (analytically reduced / translated without remainder) into functional statements. (Analytic functionalism)
- For any of these species of functionalism students might define it as a role or realiser version (but need not):
 - Role functionalists identify mental properties with a higher-level functional / causal / relational properties.
 - Realiser functionalists identify mental properties with whichever actual properties realise the functional roles.

Indicative content for 2 marks

- All mental states can be characterised in terms of their functional roles.
- Mental states are all just physical states, playing functional roles which can be multiply realised.

Indicative content for 1 mark

- Mental states are functional states.
- Functionalists claim the mind is a system of inputs and outputs.

NB: Functionalism is silent on the ontological questions of mind (e.g. the physicalism v dualism debate). As a matter of fact, the best-known functionalists are physicalists, and some students may answer in a way that seems to imply a physicalist module in their explanations or examples. These students should not be penalised. But it is factually inaccurate to *define* functionalism as a physicalist position, and functionalism is set apart from physicalist positions in the current AQA specification. As such, students who explicitly characterise functionalism as physicalist will lack precision in their answer.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

- 0 7** Explain the view that 'hard' behaviourists cannot satisfactorily define mental states due to the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Students may begin by explaining what 'hard' philosophical behaviourists claim: "all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements" (AQA specification).
- This issue of "multiple realisability" is an issue that arises in relation to the behavioural analysis of mental terms that is given by (hard) behaviourists.
- The problem is that, in principle, very many (perhaps even any/all) behaviours will be part of the analysis of any given mental state. This will be because of differences in (a) how people act and/or (b) differences in the conditions in which the disposition is manifested.
 - (a): for example, the analysis of "S is afraid of spiders" would be a conditional with an open-ended consequent of the form "if S sees a spider, S will run away / hide / say a prayer / etc.," given the possibility of different responses from different people or the same person at different times.
 - (b): for example, the analysis of "S is afraid of spiders" would be conditional with an open-ended antecedent on account of all the possible triggering environmental inputs and all the possible other mental states that are true of the individual, thus having the form: "if (i) S sees a spider then [...] unless S is in an important business meeting in which case S will [...] unless S believes that spider is very dangerous in which case [...] or (ii) S hears people talking about a spider then [...] unless [...]...; or (iii) ..."
- This is what is known as the "multiple realisability" of mental states in behaviour".
- In explaining exactly why this is an issue, students may say any of the following:
 - We can no longer state what it is that makes it the case that two people have the same mental state given that their behaviours/behavioural dispositions are different – one way of putting this is that we can no longer give the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a particular mental state (as philosophical behaviourism would require us to be able to do).
 - The list of possible behaviours for each mental state will be, in principle, infinite, which is (a) problematic in itself as the analysis cannot be completed (and a translation *has* to be complete to be a proper translation/reduction) and (b) would mean that all mental state terms would, in the end, have the same analysis and hence mean the same thing, which is clearly absurd.

0 8 Explain how natural selection / evolution poses a challenge for epiphenomenalist dualism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Epiphenomenalist dualism

Epiphenomenalist dualism is the view that:

- **Dualism (of some form) is true**
 - Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (the mental and are physical are ontologically distinct).
 - Property dualism: there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to physical properties (there is one substance but ontologically distinct properties: mental properties and physical properties).
 - (NB: students are not expected to distinguish between these forms of dualism. They may use either (or both) so long as there is evidence that they understand the position).
- **Mental events are caused by physical events**
- **Mental events are causally impotent: they are (merely) epiphenomena**
 - Mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events.
 - They are a mere “by-product” of physical events.
 - Property dualists might put the impotency point in the following way: events are causes in virtue of their physical and not mental properties.

NB: The account above is how epiphenomenalism is normally understood. It is worth noting, however, that some claim that the following view (which differs slightly from 2 and 3 above) would also count as an epiphenomenalist view and so we include it in case a student presents the theory in this way:

- Non-physical mental events are caused by physical events but they do *not* themselves have any effects on physical events though they may have mental effects.

The focus of this question is on a particular problem facing epiphenomenalism, therefore it is not to be expected that students will explain epiphenomenalism at the level of detail included above.

The issue based on evolution/natural selection:

- ‘Natural selection’ is the process described in evolutionary theory to explain the evolution of particular traits in a population of organisms. Given a population in which there is variation of traits, where that variation is heritable, and where there is natural competition (prey, limited resources, etc.) members of that population with a heritable a trait conducive to their survival will be, in virtue of that trait, more likely therefore to survive so as to produce offspring than other organisms without this trait, driving the spread of this trait throughout the population.
- The issue facing epiphenomenalist dualism may be presented as follows:
 - Organisms with mental states have ultimately evolved from creatures that lack them and this is a result of natural selection.
 - For natural selection to select a feature, it must be causally potent: ie its presence/absence bestows different causal powers on the organism that has it.
 - Therefore, mental states have causal powers.
 - According to epiphenomenalist dualism, mental states have no causal powers.
 - Therefore, epiphenomenalism is false.
- One may also put the point in the following way: since mental states cannot have emerged through the well-established theory of evolution by natural selection, epiphenomenalist dualism incurs the considerable problem of explaining how certain organisms come to have them.
- One may also put the point in the following way: natural selection selects those traits conducive to survival and so if mental states have evolved, they should be conducive to survival; but since they have no effects, they cannot make a difference to whether we survive or not, which is absurd as it is surely obvious that they do (e.g. the sensation of pain benefits an organism by causing it not to go near the source of pain again.) As Frank Jackson puts it: *“[This] objection relates to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution. According to natural selection the traits that evolve over time are those conducive to physical survival. We may assume that qualia evolved over time - we have them, the earliest forms of life do not -and so we should expect qualia to be conducive to survival. The objection is that they could hardly help us to survive if they do nothing to the physical world” (Epiphenomenal Qualia).*

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 9

Outline eliminative materialism **and** explain the issue that our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations.

[12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Outline eliminative materialism...

- Students might explain eliminative materialism as the position that some or all common-sense (“folk-psychological”) mental states/properties do not exist and/or our common-sense understanding of mind is radically mistaken. This thesis is defended most notably by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland (although students may associate Dennett with a tendency in that direction).
- Folk psychology (challenged by eliminative materialism) is (a) an ‘untutored’ or ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of others) which (b) involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states/events with certain features and (c) enables people to explain and predict human behaviour.

...and explain the issue of our certainty about the existence of mental states taking priority over other considerations.

- This issue could be proposed with different argumentative force.
 - (1) The absolute certainty that I have that my mind and its mental states exist means that I can reject, with equivalent/absolute certainty, the claims made by eliminative materialists. This is the force with which someone like Descartes would make this point.

- (2)) The high (but not absolute) level of certainty that I have that my mind and its mental states exist means that I can reject, with an equivalent (and so not absolute) level of certainty, the claims made by eliminative materialists.
- Both are acceptable, but this mark scheme will use the language/force of the former in the remainder.
- I know, through introspection, that my mind and its mental states exist. I have direct awareness of my mind and these mental states.
- This knowledge survives the radical doubt (e.g. the 'evil demon' hypothesis) which renders, importantly, the claims of science dubitable.
- Hence any claims that might be supported by science (e.g. those made by the eliminative materialist) will not cast doubt over my knowledge of my mind and its mental states.
- Students might put this point in the following way: this introspective self-knowledge is pre/non-theoretical and so cannot even be thought of as being a theory that could be compared with (and thus rejected in favour of) the competing eliminativist theory.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

1 0 Can a dualist account of mental states be successfully defended?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

NB: Although dualist claims about minds and their properties are at the heart of this question, it is possible that students will want to advance alternative accounts of minds and their properties, drawing from a broad range of theories. These alternative approaches are perfectly acceptable so long as they show understanding of dualism, critical engagement with dualist arguments and feed into an overall argument directed at the specific question (i.e. whether dualism can be defended).

- Students may well begin by explaining what dualism is. There are various versions that could be discussed.
- Property dualism: “There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties” (AQA specification). At least some mental properties are non-physical (likely to refer to either intentional or phenomenal properties or both).
- Substance dualism: “Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies” (AQA specification). There are two kinds of substance, mental and physical: minds are therefore independent non-physical substance/s.
- In the context of discussions of causation, students may also look at different (substance or property) dualist accounts of the interaction between the mind and physical reality: epiphenomenalism dualism, parallelist dualism, occasionalist dualism, overdeterminist dualism, emergentist dualism, etc.
- There may be discussions of panpsychist property dualism (ie panpsychism understood as a kind of property dualism): the view that consciousness is a fundamental, universal and non-physical property of physical reality.
- There may be some discussion of predicate dualism as the only plausible form of dualism: the view that mental predicates are essential for a full description of the world, and that they are not reducible to physical predicates.

Dualism constitutes a denial of physicalism/materialism (at least in some sense):

- Physicalism: the ontological/metaphysical claim that everything is physical (or at least that everything supervenes on the physical: there can be no change in any property something has without a change in the physical properties it has) – so minds are not ontologically distinct from the physical.
- Physicalism and materialism may be used here interchangeably (and that would be fine), although a change in usage does correlate with historical changes in philosophical conceptions about the nature of material / physical reality. Some students may exploit those changes.
- Materialism may be understood as the ontological/metaphysical claim that everything is constituted of inert matter; and so minds are constituted out of matter (this was an early modern view). Physicalism (or later materialism) does not limit material reality in this way: to extended substance, or matter in motion. Current physics, for example, admits energy and fields of force as physical.

Conclusions may be drawn from the following:

- **It depends:** Some but not all parts/properties of the mind are non-physical (eg pain as physical and located, but imaginings as non-physical).
- **YES (property dualism):** Mental properties are non-physical, but they are non-physical properties of physical minds which are part of physical substance.
- **YES (substance dualism):** Minds and their properties are non-physical (ie non-physical substance or at least non-physical mental properties exist).
- **NO:** Minds and their properties are part of the physical world and so are not non-physical.
- **NO:** Minds and their properties are not non-physical, but neither are they part of the physical world – we make a mistaken assumption...

...that a mind is a thing in the first place (according to at least some philosophical behaviourists);

...that a mind is something understood in folk-psychological terms (according to eliminative materialism).

- **NO (idealism):** Dualists are right to say that minds and their properties are non-physical, but wrong to say that mind-independent objects/properties exist in addition to this (eg an idealist or monist panpsychist approach that claims that the so-called 'non-mental' is ultimately reducible to the mental/non-physical).
- **YES:** Some students may aim to support dualism by giving reasons for rejecting several physicalist alternatives making dualism more likely or leaving dualism as the only viable option. This approach will only work well if the reasons for rejecting these physicalist approaches are identified clearly as being reasons that themselves support dualism.

Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions and content discussed may be drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive).

YES: Dualism of some form can be defended: ie non-physical substance or at least non-physical mental properties exist (so defending dualist arguments).

- The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).
- The conceivability argument for substance dualism: the metaphysical possibility of mental substance existing without the physical (Descartes).
- The 'philosophical zombies' argument for property dualism: the metaphysical possibility of a physical duplicate of this world but without consciousness/qualia (Chalmers).
- The 'knowledge'/Mary argument for property dualism based on qualia (Jackson).
- The argument from intentionality for property dualism: mental states have intrinsic (as opposed to derived) intentionality but no physical states do (the irreducibility of intentionality).

Possible responses include:

- The mental is divisible in some sense; not everything thought of as physical is divisible.
- Mind without body is not conceivable; what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible; what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality (ie the actual world).
- A 'zombie' world is not conceivable; what is conceivable is not metaphysically possible; what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality (ie the actual world).
- Mary gains no new propositional knowledge (but gains acquaintance knowledge or ability knowledge); all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia; there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact (often put as the sense/reference reply); qualia (as defined) do not exist and so Mary gains no propositional knowledge.

Alternative non-dualist theories and arguments:

NO (philosophical behaviourism):

- Minds and their properties are not non-physical, but neither are they things in the physical world – we make a mistaken assumption that a mind is a thing in the first place.
- Dualists make a category mistake (Ryle).
- To make a category mistake is to assign a concept to a logical category to which it doesn't belong. A 'category mistake' is a 'logical' or a 'semantic' mistake.
- Ryle claims that substance dualism (a) assigns 'mind' (and mental states') to "the categories of 'thing,' 'stuff,' 'attribute,' 'state,' 'process,' 'change,' 'cause,' and 'effect.'" and (b) conceives of them as non-physical and 'ghostly.'
- Ryle illustrates the category mistake of thinking about 'the mind' as a separate non-physical 'thing' by applying a number of analogies, which all have the following features: once one has a complete description of the component parts of some designated phenomena and how they work together (eg the 'colleges', 'lecture theatres', and 'libraries' of a university) it is a mistake to look for something 'over and above' those constitutive features.
- Ryle argues, instead, that to talk about 'the mind' and 'mental states' is to talk about publicly observable overt behaviour or behavioural dispositions which can be expressed in hypothetical and empirically verifiable if-then sentences: these behaviours/dispositions just are 'the mind'.

NO (eliminative materialism):

- Minds and their properties are not non-physical, but neither are they part of the physical world – we make a mistaken assumption that a mind is something understood in folk-psychological terms (according to eliminative materialism).
- Folk-psychology is an empirical theory (it postulates 'mental states', such as 'beliefs' and 'desire', to explain and predict behaviour) which does not fulfil the criteria for a good empirical theory:
 - There are explanatory failures: folk-psychology cannot offer (scientifically) satisfactory explanations of mental illness, creative imagination, pre-linguistic learning, or memory. There are problems matching up the concepts of folk-psychology with those of the natural sciences.
 - Growth and promise: folk psychology is 'stagnant' and 'infertile.' There hasn't been any growth and development for thousands of years.
 - Coherence: folk psychology doesn't cohere with other empirical theories such as particle physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic chemistry, evolutionary theory physiology, and neuroscience.

NO (functionalism):

- Minds and their properties are physically realised in the actual world but should be understood functionally meaning that there may be possible worlds in which they are non-physically realised.
- Minds and their properties are non-physically realised in the actual world but should be understood functionally meaning that there may be possible worlds in which they are physically realised.
- Mental states are multiply realisable: what characterises mental states (eg pain) is not that they are physical or non-physical in nature but rather their functional/causal role (functionalism).

NO (mind-brain type identity theory):

- All mental states are identical to brain states ('ontological' reduction) although the concepts/terms 'mental state' and 'brain state' are not synonymous (so not an 'analytic' reduction).

- Evidence for the neural dependence of all mental phenomena (the effects of drugs and brain damage, MRI of the brain) is best explained by supposing that minds are brains (or at least that any mind that existed is likely to be physical).

General pro-physicalist arguments:

- It avoids the problems facing interactionist dualism, including conceptual and empirical causation issues (ie the latter = dualism is inconsistent with the widely accepted view that the physical world is causally closed and that energy is conserved).
- It avoids the problems facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: (a) the causal redundancy of the mental; (b) the argument from introspection; (c) issues relating to free will and responsibility; (d) epistemological problems (eg how can I know that I am having an experience of such and such a kind if the quale has no causal power?).
- Avoids problems arising from the view that non-physical mental states represent physical reality (there is not enough in common to sustain this relationship of representation - this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content) – NB: intentionality issues cut both ways and some see intentionality of mental states as constituting an argument against physicalism (see earlier).
- It makes mental states empirically discoverable by science and so arguably solves the problem of other minds facing versions of dualism.
- It arguably makes claims about the mind (at least potentially) verifiable and so mental terms/talk meaningful (an argument often made by behaviourist materialists).
- Naturalistic arguments: the purely physical origins, and physical constitution of each individual human being, and the material evolutionary origins of the species suggest there is no explanation of origin of an immaterial mind.
- Successful reductions in the history of science (eg sound to compression waves of air), give us (inductive) reason to believe that an equivalent reduction is possible for minds.
- Ockham's razor: physicalism is to be preferred over dualism as it requires fewer entities, so long as it explains the phenomena (at least) as well as dualism (see dualist arguments).
- There may also be sceptical responses to dualist arguments which nevertheless acknowledge the (possibility inherent) limitations of materialist accounts: eg we may not have (or ever have) the theoretical/conceptual apparatus needed to understand/carry out a naturalistic reduction of the mind to the brain but this does not show that it is not reducible in such a way (McGinn's epistemological pessimism).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.