

A-level  
**PHILOSOPHY**  
**7172/2**

Paper 2 The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

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Mark scheme

June 2023

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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## Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

### Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

### Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

## Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

**Section A**

**Metaphysics of God**

**0 1** What does Swinburne mean by ‘temporal order/regularity’ in his design argument? **[3 marks]**

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

Context

- In ‘The Argument from Design’ Swinburne identifies “two kinds of regularity or order”: “spatial order” (or “regularities of copresence”) and “temporal order” (or “regularities of succession”).
- Where “spatial order” is used as evidence in design arguments it is open to famous objections: eg Hume’s critique of analogy and Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. Swinburne thinks that “temporal order” is not vulnerable to those objections.
- If students explain the meaning of “temporal order” though reference to this distinction it should not be classed as redundancy. It is important, however, that students do not confuse the two kinds of order in their explanations.

Awarding marks

- Responses awarded maximum marks will contain **(1)** a reference to the ‘temporal’ dimension of this ‘order’, since this is the most salient feature [NB: This must be in connection with a relevant aspect of Swinburne’s design argument]; and **(2)** explain the ‘order/regularity’ in terms of some relevant feature of Swinburne’s design argument *other than the fact it concludes in favour of a designer*: eg “regularities of succession”, “simple patterns of behaviour of objects”, the “laws of nature”.
- Students do not need to refer to God (or a designer) to access full marks. Some will, and that is fine, but if they do then they must of course represent Swinburne’s argument accurately: that ‘temporal order/regularity’ is best explained by a personal agent (or cause) and so a designer (God) probably exists.

Examples of responses for 3 marks

- Temporal regularity refers to the order(s) of succession in nature/the world.
- The temporal arrangement (or regular patterns/behaviours) of physical objects / features of the universe (such as those explained by the laws of nature).
- The constancy/consistently in how events follow each other in time.

Examples of responses for 2 marks

- The laws of nature (which Swinburne thinks are best explained personally, by God).  
NB: If students mention ‘fine tuning’, they can still get 2 marks if they are connecting temporal order to the laws of nature, but it is not a 3-mark response if they do this, as Swinburne treats them as separate (although of course related) design arguments.
- The regularity/order of events in time (which Swinburne argues is evidence for a designer).

Examples of responses for 1 mark

- A temporal feature of the universe that requires a designer (or personal agency) to explain it.
- The kind of (temporal) order found in human activities (like dancing or singing) which require a personal explanation.

NB: Examples are not asked for or required, but students should not be penalised for redundancy if they make use of relevant ones.

- If students only refer to human activities in their examples of ‘temporal order/regularity’, this should not be penalised so long as they have *not defined* ‘temporal order/regularity’ in terms of human activities alone. The latter is clearly too narrow a definition for Swinburne’s purposes but is worthy of some credit.

**Notes:**

Swinburne gives various examples of natural temporal order/regularity: eg. “behaviour in accordance with the laws of nature – for example, Newton’s law of gravitation”.

Swinburne also gives examples of human order/regularity: eg. “regularities of succession produced by men are the notes of a song sung by a singer or the movements of a dancer’s body when he performs a dance in time with the accompanying instrument”.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 2** Outline Norman Malcolm’s ontological argument.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

- Ontological arguments are a priori arguments for the existence of God (in the sense that all of the premises involved are themselves a priori).
- They are advanced as deductive arguments, intended to yield decisive conclusions given the truth of the premises.
- Malcolm’s version is contained in the article ‘Anselm’s ontological arguments’, and students may reasonably make an association between the two versions. Indeed, if they take Anselm’s conception of God as a being “greater than which cannot be conceived” as a premise from which they derive God’s “necessary” (or “impossible”) existence, this is fine. It should not be penalised as irrelevant or redundant.
- Students may mention that Malcom’s ontological argument is a modal version.
- Here is one way of setting Malcolm’s argument out in standard form.
  - P1: God is conceived as an unlimited/infinite being
  - P2: Either God does not exist or God exists.
  - P3: If God does not exist then God’s existence would be impossible
    - (because God cannot come into existence: it would either mean that his existence was caused by something else or just “happened” to occur, both of which would mean that God was limited).
  - P4: If God does exist then God’s existence must be necessary
    - (because God cannot come into or go out of existence: it would mean again that either God’s existence/demise was caused by something else or just “happened” to occur, both of which would mean that God was limited).
  - C1: Therefore, God’s existence is either impossible or necessary.
  - P5: If God’s existence is impossible then the concept must be self-contradictory/incoherent.
  - P6: The concept of a necessary being (God) is not self-contradictory (it is coherent).
  - C2: Therefore, God’s existence is not impossible.
  - C3: Therefore, God’s existence is necessary (God must exist).

NB:

- Some students will have tried to stick so closely to what is most distinctive in Malcom’s argument that they may have omitted the first and most obvious premise: God as ‘unlimited’ or

being 'greater than which nothing can be conceived'. If they do this, but the rest of their argument is precise and full, then they can be awarded 4 marks.

- This question is asking for an outline of Malcolm's argument (either step-by-step or in continuous prose). There is no expectation that students will explain any of the premises.
- If students give versions of other ontological arguments (such as those on the specification), they may be credited at Level 1 for any (accurate) generic points. To progress any further, however, they must reference distinctive features of Malcolm's argument.
- There is no credit available for claiming that Malcolm tries to 'define God into existence', although if students refer to Malcolm's 'definition' of God rather than to 'conception' or 'idea', this is to be treated as a minor imprecision.

**Notes:**

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 3** Explain how Ayer’s verification principle challenges the status of religious language. **[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

- The verification principle as define by Ayer: a (cognitively) meaningful utterance/sentence/proposition is either:
  - (1) an analytic (conceptual, tautological, logical) truth
  - or
  - (2) empirically verifiable
    - Weak version: its probable truth could (potentially) be empirically verified.
    - Strong version: its truth could in practice be conclusively empirically verified.
- Students may (but need not) associate this with the logical positivist movement.
- Applying this to religious language (taking God as the likely example):
  - Because ‘God’ is a ‘metaphysical term/concept’ no sentences about God can be empirically verified, and claims about God are not analytically true. Therefore, no sentences about God are (cognitively) meaningful.
- Students may (but need not) add that this includes statements denying the existence of God (ie atheistic claims) and statements that are non-committal (ie agnostic claims). They still fail to satisfy the criteria for meaningfulness.
- Students may use other religious concepts in their answer: eg ‘gods’, ‘souls’, ‘heaven’, ‘hell’, ‘nirvana’.
- Students may also refer to ‘religious language’ in general without using examples.

**Notes:**

Even if (some) utterances/propositions including the term ‘God’ were analytically true, for Ayer this means that they are not factual statements and so they are nothing more than statements about the meanings of words (he denies that God’s existence can be established using a priori propositions/arguments).

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.



- 0 4** Outline what it means to say that God is supremely good (omnibenevolent) **and** explain how the Euthyphro dilemma challenges this attribute.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

Outline what it means to say that God is supremely good (omnibenevolent)...

- In terms of God’s supreme goodness/omnibenevolence there are various things that theists might mean by this that may be separated out.
  1. Moral perfection: God does not do or command anything that is morally wrong, either:
    - (a) because God always refrains from doing/commanding anything that is morally wrong despite the possibly (given God’s omnipotence): God is contingently supremely good.
    - Or (b) because God cannot possibly do/command anything that is morally wrong: God is necessarily supremely good – (note that this now causes issues for God’s omnipotence).
  2. Theological voluntarism: God is the source of all (moral) goodness in so far as God chooses what is right and what is wrong (good or bad). This it is also called ‘Divine Command Theory’ since God’s commands determine what is right and wrong (good or bad).
    - Eg “The Lord said to Moses, ‘Come up to me on the mountain and wait there, that I may give you the tablets of stone, with the law and the commandment, which I have written for their instruction’” (Exodus 24:12–13).

- The second of these notions of God’s supreme goodness (theological voluntarism) is presupposed in one horn of the dilemma itself, so students may very well not mention it as part of their definition of the meaning of the term ‘supremely good’. And that is fine.

3. God is the source of all (moral) goodness in something along the lines of the Platonic Form of the Good (and evil is the absence of God/goodness): God is the eternal/infinite/perfect (moral) good in which all temporal/finite/imperfect (moral) goods participate.

...and explain how the Euthyphro dilemma challenges this.

- Students may begin by outlining in general terms what a dilemma is – a situation/idea involving two options, neither of which is satisfactory (usually for different reasons).
- The ‘Euthyphro dilemma’ challenges common theistic assumptions about the relationship between God and morality.
- The ‘Euthyphro dilemma’ is an issue facing the concept of God within classical theism, in particular the notion of supreme goodness and (in some presentations omnipotence, but that is not the focus here).
- The Euthyphro dilemma originates with Plato in his dialogue *Euthyphro* (although the focus there is on ‘piety’ rather than ‘goodness’, and the dilemma occurs within a ‘polytheistic’ rather than ‘monotheistic’ context). It has been discussed by Leibniz (among many others) as an issue for God within Christian theology and classical theism more generally.
- Students may initially outline the dilemma in the form of a question: eg ‘Assuming that God is supremely good/omnibenevolent, does God will what is (morally) good because it is (morally) good, or is it (morally) good because God wills it?’ It is assumed that if God is supremely (morally) good then one of these options must be the case (there are no further options). Each option, however, appears unsatisfactory for classical theism:

**Option One: God wills what is morally good because it is morally good.**

- This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills and therefore severs the *essential* relationship between God and moral goodness.
- This also implies that God could not change what constitutes moral goodness and thus challenges the notion that God is omnipotent – that God can do anything.  
NB: That is only relevant here, though, in so far as the focus is on the implications for God’s supreme goodness.
- This also challenges any scriptural accounts (eg in the Bible or the Quran) which suggest that moral laws are created by God (through an act of will).

**Option Two: What is morally good is morally good because God wills it.**

- If moral goodness is whatever God wills, then ‘God is good’ does not say anything morally substantive about the relationship between God’s will or goodness – it is a tautology, empty of content.
- If moral goodness is whatever God wills then morality is arbitrary: there is no *reason* why God wills as God does (if there was, then morality would be a standard ‘beyond’ God and the divine will).
- The arbitrary and tautological nature of the relationship between God and morality has disturbing and counterintuitive consequences: on this view ‘killing children’, for example, would have to be (or have to have been) considered ‘morally good’ simply by virtue of God willing it (or having willed it).
- If moral goodness is whatever God wills, then praising (or worshipping) God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement or greatness on God’s part.

- Because both horns of the dilemma are unsatisfactory it follows that God's relationship to moral goodness is inherently problematic.

NB: Students do not need to cover all the above points to access the top band of marks, but they must explain at least one point on each horn in sufficient detail. Students may reference the problems posed to 'God's omnipotence' and still access the top band of marks, but only if the main focus on both horns is problems with God's supreme goodness.

**Notes:**

Responses that note that the original Platonic context was 'piety' and 'gods' (rather than 'goodness' and 'God') are not to be penalised for redundancy as they are showing knowledge of the primary source on the specification.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 5** Does the cosmological argument prove that God exists?

**[25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument.                  There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.                  There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.                  There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

- Conclusions argued for may include:
  - **YES:** The cosmological argument proves (conclusively) that God exists. (The argument is understood deductively with the conclusion following from the premises.)
  - **NO:** The cosmological argument fails to prove (conclusively) that God exists. (The argument is understood deductively with the conclusion failing to follow from the premises.)
  - **YES:** The cosmological argument establishes that God probably exists. (The argument is understood inductively/abductively, with God’s existence as the best explanation of the existence of the universe.)
  - **NO:** The cosmological argument fails to establish that God probably exists. (The argument is understood inductively/abductively, with God’s existence as a possible explanation but not the best explanation of the existence of the universe.)
  - **NO:** The cosmological argument fails to establish either that God exists or that God does not exist.
    - It may be argued that the argument cannot establish the existence of God as any more or less probable than God’s non-existence.
    - It may be argued that the premises are too problematic to constitute the start of a cosmological argument for the existence of God.
  - **It Depends:** If students consider more than one cosmological argument, then they may, of course, draw different conclusions for different arguments.
  
- Students may define God as a supremely perfect or a maximally great being (omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good, eternal or everlasting, etc), or they may take a more minimalist approach: God is conceived, for the purposes of the discussion, as the first/primary cause (explanation or reason) of the universe/cosmos.
- Students may begin by outlining cosmological arguments in general: an a posteriori forms of theistic proof/demonstration which argue from premises concerning the existence of the cosmos/universe, or some feature(s) of the cosmos/universe, to the existence of a first cause (explanation or reason): God.
- Students may discuss one or more of the following specific cosmological arguments.
  - The Kalām causal argument: the universe had a beginning, so requires a cause (ie God).
  - Aquinas’ 1st and 2nd ways: motion/change (first way), and efficient causation (second way), must have a prime mover/changer or first efficient cause (ie God).
    - Aquinas understood these arguments as deductive demonstrations of a ‘vertical’ sustaining cause of (a) motion/causation at any given moment and/or (b) the series of causes as a whole (even if this is an infinite temporal series).
    - Some students may (re)interpret them as (inductive or deductive) arguments for the existence of God as the explanation for a ‘horizontal’ or chronologically prior chain of movers/changers or efficient causes (where this is a finite temporal series). Depending on the nature of the objections raised, such approaches may be faulted for not presenting the arguments on their strongest terms. But this would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

- Arguments from contingency.
  - Aquinas' 3rd way: if everything was merely possible/contingent then at some point there must have been nothing at all. But there are possible/contingent beings, and given that nothing can come from nothing, this means that a necessary being must exist.
  - Leibniz: According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason: there must be an explanation for why contingent beings exist given that they might not have. God (a necessary being) provides this explanation. According to the Strong Principle of Sufficient Reason: there must be an explanation for every positive fact, including the fact that contingent beings exist. God is the necessary explanation of that fact.
- Descartes' cosmological ('Trademark') argument: students may discuss either or both of the following arguments (though for Descartes they are two parts of one overall argument).
  - (1) God as cause of my idea of God. I have an idea of a supremely perfect being (ie God): that is, an infinite being. By the 'causal adequacy principle' (ie that there must be at least as much (total) reality in the cause as in the effect), I cannot be the cause of this idea as I am finite. Only God could be the cause of this idea and so God must exist.
  - (2) God as cause of my existence (with an idea of God in my mind): I exist as a being with an idea of a supremely perfect being. The only possible cause of my existence as such is God. I cannot be the cause of myself as I would then be God and I know I am not. No other being(s) could be the cause because either the question would be raised about them (leading to a regress) or they could not account for the idea of God that I have. Nor can I have no cause, as a cause is needed to sustain anything finite from one moment to the next.
- 'Horizontal' versions may support the finiteness of the universe.
  - A posteriori: by reference to expanding universes, 2nd law of thermodynamics (if the world were infinitely old there would be no available energy), the 'big bang' – there are of course competing theories within physics/cosmology.
  - A priori: based on the logical impossibility of infinite series (eg Zeno's paradoxes or the claim that infinite time cannot be traversed). Some might reference the thought experiment by David Hilbert (the 'Infinite Hotel' paradox) and use this to argue against the conceivability of a real/actual infinity.
- Issues with these arguments may include some of the following (adapted to the particular argument).
  - Theists have to believe in the possibility of an infinite series – God knows infinite propositions and this would be an actual infinity in the mind of God – so cannot oppose infinity on logical grounds without inconsistency.
  - It is not the case that everything needs a cause/explanation (or at least we cannot know whether it is the case a priori or a posteriori) – Hume.
  - There is no need for any further explanation once every particular has been explained.
  - This last point may or may not be put in terms of claiming that the argument commits the fallacy of composition (Russell and Hume) – the fact that all parts of the universe have/require a cause/explanation does not mean that the universe as a whole does.
  - If everything needed a further cause/explanation, this would have to apply to God as well or, vice-versa, if God is unexplained/uncaused, then the universe could be too.
  - Even if there is a cause/explanation of this universe, we cannot assume that it is God (with all God's traditional attributes).
  - A necessary being is impossible (most relevant to contingency versions of the argument) – Hume.
  - Our concepts of cause and beginning relate to what we can experience rather than the universe as a whole, so it does not make sense to ask for the cause of the universe itself – Hume and Kant.

- Descartes' arguments can be challenged by an attack on the causal adequacy principle, by offering alternative explanations of the idea of God in his mind, or using some of the points above.
- According to modern mathematics, actual infinities are not problematic (but there is a question about whether this is applicable to the physical world).

**Notes:**

Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments. Persistent misattribution of arguments would certainly be a reason for not awarding a response full marks (this would be a deficiency in knowledge/accuracy), but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band assuming that the relevant level descriptors have, in general, been met.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**Section B**

**Metaphysics of mind**

**0 6** What are phenomenal properties?

**[3 marks]**

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

- Philosophers disagree about the nature of phenomenal properties, and some doubt whether they exist at all (as traditionally understood). If students mention this in their answers, they should not be penalised for redundancy, but in terms of positive definitions, there are various approaches they could take.
- Many students will take ‘phenomenal properties’ as synonymous with ‘qualia’, and if they give explanations which are interchangeable with ‘qualia’, that is fine. But there are other approaches illustrated below.

Examples of responses for 3 marks

- They are the experiential properties of some (or all) conscious (mental) states.
- They are intrinsic, non-intentional (and non-representational) properties of mental states (ie qualia).
- They are the introspectively (immediately/non-inferentially/infallibly) accessible properties of mental states (ie qualia).
- The (ineffable) properties that determine the phenomenal character of what it is like to undergo a (conscious) mental states.
- They are the properties of how things appear to (or are experienced by) the mind.

Examples of responses for 2 marks

- Phenomenal properties are the ‘what it is like’ of mental states.
- The properties of (subjective) experience

Examples of responses for 1 mark

- Qualia
- Phenomenal properties are private/subjective
- Phenomenal properties are individual (or unique) to a person (or perceiver).



**NB:**

- Students cannot get to 3 marks by combining examples of responses from the lower levels. But if a 3-mark response also contains additional points from those lower levels, students should not be penalised for redundancy, assuming there is not gratuitous repetition.
- Students may say that phenomenal properties are 'non-physical', and that is fine, as some philosophers do indeed hold that view. But it would be wrong to say that only dualists (and no physicalists) accept the existence of phenomenal properties.
- Do not award marks for responses which *only* give examples of qualia (eg the 'redness of a rose', or the 'sweet taste of pineapple'). But as examples of more general definitions, this would be fine.

**Notes:**

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 7** Explain how substance dualism and property dualism differ.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

Substance dualism

- Minds exist and are not identical to material bodies or to parts of material bodies: mind and body are ontologically distinct (at the level of substance).
- Two kinds of substance exist: (1) physical/material substance (described by Descartes as “res extensa” where the principal attribute is extension) and (2) non-physical/immaterial/mental substance (described by Descartes as “res cogitans”: the principal attribute is thought/consciousness).

Property dualism

- Two distinct types of property exist: (1) physical properties (or at least properties that are reducible to or supervenient upon physical properties) and (2) [at least some] non-physical (mental) properties which are neither reducible to nor (logically/necessarily) supervenient upon physical properties (though they may actually/contingently supervene on physical properties).

How they differ

Substance dualism	Property dualism
Substance dualists claim that there are non-physical/immaterial/mental substances, ie substances which don't possess typical features of physical substances such as spatial dimensions and mass.	Property substance dualists do <u>not</u> claim that there are non-physical/immaterial/mental substances.
Substance dualists claim that all mental properties are non-physical properties of <u>non-physical/immaterial/mental substance</u> .	Property dualists claim that some or all mental properties (typically, phenomenal/intentional properties) are non-physical properties of <u>physical/material substance</u> (ordinarily claiming that they are properties of brains/brain states).
Substance dualists claim that minds/mental states and mental substance/s could possibly exist in the absence of physical substance (eg Descartes' conceivability argument).	(Some) property dualists claim that minds/mental states/properties could <u>not</u> possibly exist in the absence of physical substance.

	NB: they may however claim that physical substance could possibly exist without having non-physical/mental properties (ie the 'philosophical zombie' scenario).
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NB: Students who define both positions briefly but correctly, with one implicit difference, may progress to Level 3: 'The substantive content of the explanation is present'. But responses progressing to Levels 4 and 5 will focus more precisely and fully on the difference(s).

**Notes:**

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 8** Explain the issue that ‘Super-Spartans’ pose for ‘hard’ behaviourism.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

- ‘Hard behaviourism’ is the view that all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (ie analytically reduced) to propositions (that exclusively use the language of physics to talk) about bodily states/movements.
- It is possible that students will begin with a definition of ‘hard behaviourism’ (as above), but others may show their understanding in the course of their explanation of the issue. That is fine.
- For those students who do give a definition, some will be more precise and detailed than others. So long as what they say is reasonably asserted of ‘hard behaviourism’, and not straightforwardly confused with ‘soft behaviourism’, do not penalise them for this.
- In introducing this issue in ‘Brains and Behaviour’, Putnam uses the following terms:
  - “Super-Spartans” (SS): adults who feel pain but are able to suppress all voluntary pain behaviour.
    - They “have the ability to successfully suppress all voluntary pain behavior. They may, on occasion, admit that they feel pain, but always in pleasant well-modulated voices ...They do not wince, scream, flinch, sob, grit their teeth, clench their fists, exhibit beads of sweat, or otherwise act like people in pain ...However, they do feel pain, and they dislike it (just as we do). They even admit that it takes a great effort of will to behave as they do.”
  - “X-worlders”/“Super-Super-Spartans” (SSS): people (both children and adults) who feel pain but suppress all pain behaviour and do not even talk about pain.
    - “...let us undertake the task of trying to imagine a world in which there are not even pain reports. I will call this world the ‘X-world’. In the X-world we have to deal with ‘Super-Super-Spartans.’ These have been Super-Spartans for so long, that they have begun to suppress even talk of pain. Of course, each individual X-worlder may have his private way of thinking about pain. He may even have the word ‘pain’ (as before, I assume that these beings are born fully acculturated). He may think to himself: ‘This pain is intolerable. If it goes on one minute longer I shall scream. Oh No! I mustn’t do that! That would disgrace my whole family ...’ But X-worlders do not even admit to having pains. They pretend not to know either the world or the phenomenon to which it refers. In short, if pains are ‘logical constructions out of behaviour’, then our X-worlders behave so as not to have pains! — Only, of course, they do have pains, and they know perfectly well that they have pains.”

- If 'hard behaviourism' is true then 'x is in pain' is analytically equivalent to some statement about x's behaviour (ultimately reducible to the language of physics).
- But if SS and SSS are conceivable, then it is possible to be in pain without exhibiting any pain behaviour.
- Because these scenarios (SSs and SSSs) are conceivable this shows that the claims of 'hard behaviourism' are false.

NB:

- Students may discuss either the "Super-Spartans", the "Super-Super-Spartans", or both. If they take up the case of the "Super-Super Spartans" but call them "Super-Spartans", that is acceptable in this context. The question is designed to assess students on the logic of Putnam's objection(s) rather than to make precise distinctions between the different phrasings at the different stages of his thought experiment.
- Students who understand the basic logic of the objection to hard behaviourism can get to Level 3 even if explicit references to language are not foregrounded (eg. 'propositions about mental states cannot, in fact, be reduced without loss of meaning...'). But responses going to Levels 4 or 5 will have a focus on language/claims/propositions/concepts etc.
- Here is one way of setting this argument out formally with reference to a "Super-Super-Spartans" (SSS):
  - P1: A SSS is someone who is in pain but shows no pain behaviour (including verbal-behaviour).
  - P2: SSSs are conceivable.
  - P3: If SSSs are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be reduced without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions about physical behaviour (ie to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements).
  - C: Therefore, hard behaviourism is false.
- Here is another (more detailed) version:
  - P1: If hard behaviourism is true, then 'x is in pain' is analytically equivalent to a statement about x's bodily movements.
  - IC1: Therefore, if hard behaviourism is true it is not possible for 'x is in pain' to be true but no statement about x's bodily movements to be true.
  - P2: A SSS is someone who is in pain but shows no pain behaviour (including verbal-behaviour) and so for whom 'x is in pain' is true but no corresponding statement about x's displaying pain behaviour is true.
  - P3: If SSSs are conceivable then it is possible for 'x is in pain' to be true (for some SSS) and for no corresponding statement about x's bodily movements to be true:
    - propositions about pain cannot be reduced without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions about physical behaviour (ie to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements).
  - IC2: Therefore, if SSS are conceivable, hard philosophical behaviourism is false.
  - P4: SSS are conceivable.
  - C: Therefore, hard philosophical behaviourism is false.
- Students may separate out conceivability and possibility and put the argument in this way, arguing that conceivability of SSSs entails their possibility and that this proves behaviourism wrong.

**Notes:**

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**0 9** Explain the 'problem of other minds' facing dualism **and** the response that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.

**[12 marks]**

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

### Indicative content

Explain the 'problem of other minds' facing dualism...

- Students may begin with a brief outline/explanation of some form of dualism (though they may also demonstrate their understanding of dualism within their account of the problem of other minds).
  - Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (the mental and the physical are ontologically distinct).
  - Property dualism: there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to physical properties (there is one substance but ontologically distinct properties: mental properties and physical properties).
- The problem/s of other minds emerges for dualism due to the epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds.
- If dualism is true then the minds of others cannot be accessed through the kind of empirical observations which typically yields knowledge of the world.
- Here is one way of setting this out.
  - P1: If dualism is correct then I have direct access to my own mental states but not to those of others.
  - P2: All I can know of others is their behaviour (and even this is not known directly, but via my mental representations of the external world).

- P3: However, I am not in a position to know that any behaviours I observe are caused by mental states in others because (a) the relationship between a mental state and a behaviour is contingent; and (b) there is no epistemological route for me to the non-physical states of others.
- C: Therefore, I am unable to know that there are other minds than my own.

...and the response that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.

- This is an abductive argument, ie an argument to the best hypothesis/explanation.
- This makes it a form of inductive argument insofar as the conclusion is seen as probable though not certain.
- People having mental states is proposed as the best explanation of the behaviour they engage in – these (internal) mental states, then, are put forward as being the likely cause of that behaviour.
- Minds can thus be seen as being ‘theoretical entities’ that we have good reason to posit. (Cf. theoretical entities posited by physicists.)
- This response does not start with and base its reasoning on the subject (himself/herself) and their introspective awareness of their own mental states – in this way it is different in form from the argument from analogy for other minds.
- Instead, this abductive inference is carried out from a third person/objective/scientific perspective.

NB: If students build in the argument from analogy as part of the reason why ‘the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis’ (framed as an additional abductive/inductive argument), then they can still access the top band. But to access that top band they must show understanding of the ‘third person/objective/scientific’ nature of the ‘best hypothesis’ response.

**Notes:**

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

**1 0** Does mind-brain type identity theory give the right account of mental states?

**[25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

<b>Marks</b>	<b>Levels of response mark scheme</b>
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>



1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument.                  There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.                  There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.                  There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

**Indicative content**

- Answers may talk interchangeably about mental/brain states, properties or events, and the mark scheme below will likewise use different terms according to context.
- Mind-brain type identity theory: a physicalist/materialist theory of mind whereby (all) mental types are neural types; all mental properties are neural properties.
- This is invariably (but not necessarily) seen as an ‘ontological reduction’ rather than an ‘analytic reduction’: mental states are identical to neural states (‘ontological reduction’) although ‘mental state’ and ‘neural state’ are not synonymous terms (so not an ‘analytic reduction’). This may be put in terms of Frege’s sense/reference distinction – a mental concept/term and a neural concept/term may have different senses but the same reference. This point may well be used by students to respond to some of the issues that arise.
- Some have treated this identity claim as a contingent truth (eg it seems that Smart does this when he claims that dualism is possible); others (post-Kripke) have seen this as having to be a necessary truth. This may come out during discussion/evaluation.

The overall positions that students adopt may include the following.

- **NO**: mental properties are non-physical properties of brains (ie property dualism). These properties are neither identical to nor logically supervenient upon physical properties.
- **NO**: minds and their properties are non-physical (substance dualism).
- **NO**: mental state types/properties are functional types/properties which are multiply realisable.
- **NO**: type identity theory does not give the right account, but token identity theory does.
- **YES**: type identity theory (as explained above) gives the right account.
- **NO**: minds and their properties are not neural because they do not (and perhaps could not) exist at all (appealing to eliminative materialist arguments).
- **It depends**: it gives the right account of some but not all mental state types/properties (some mental state types/properties are neural types/properties – eg pain as physical and neural – but some are not – eg imaginings as non-physical).

Conclusions may be supported by arguments drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath:

**NO**: mental properties are non-physical properties of brains (ie property dualism). These properties are neither identical to, nor logically supervenient upon, physical properties.

**NO**: minds and their properties are non-physical (substance dualism).

- The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).
- The conceivability argument for substance dualism: the logical possibility of mental substance existing without the physical (Descartes).

- The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism: the logical possibility of a physical duplicate of this world but without consciousness/qualia (Chalmers).
- The location problem: brain states have precise spatial locations which thoughts lack.
- The ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism based on qualia (Jackson).
- The argument from intentionality for property dualism: only mental states have intrinsic (as opposed to derived) intentionality (the irreducibility of intentionality).
- Kripke’s argument against identity theory: If pain were identical to some type of brain state (say, c-fibres firing) then this would have to be a necessary (a posteriori) identity. However, this is not the case since there are possible worlds in which pain is not identical to c-fibres firing (and vice versa). Therefore, pain is not identical to c-fibres firing.

**NO:** minds and their properties are not neural because they do not (and perhaps could not) exist at all (appealing to eliminative materialist arguments).

- Eliminative materialists would reject MBTIT because of its commitment to a false theory of mind (ie “folk-psychology”). Mental states should not be reduced to brain states but mental concepts should, rather, be eliminated.
- One way of doing this would be to suggest (as Patricia Churchland has) that there is nothing in the brain which remotely resembles the sentence-like structure essential to propositional attitudes.

**NO:** mental state types/properties are functional types/properties which are multiply realisable.

- Mental states are multiply realisable: what characterises mental states (eg pain) is not that they are physical or non-physical in nature but rather their functional/causal role (role functionalism).
  - Token identity theory may here be used as an attempt to deal with multiple realisability issues while retaining an identity theory.

**YES:** type identity theory (as explained above) gives the right account.

- The strength of such a position could be located in the extent to which it successfully avoids problems facing dualism.
  - It avoids the problems facing interactionist dualism, including conceptual and empirical causation issues (eg on the latter: dualism is inconsistent with the widely accepted view that the physical world is causally closed and that energy is conserved).
  - It avoids the problems facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: (a) the causal redundancy of the mental; (b) the argument from introspection; (c) issues relating to free will and responsibility; (d) epistemological problems (eg how can I know that I am having a red experience if the quale has no causal power?).
  - It avoids problems arising from the view that non-physical mental states represent physical reality (there is not enough in common to sustain this relationship of representation – this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content).
  - It makes mental states empirically discoverable by science and so arguably solves the problem of other minds facing versions of dualism.
  - It arguably makes claims about the mind (at least potentially) verifiable and so mental terms/talk meaningful (an argument often made by behaviourist materialists).
  - Naturalistic arguments: the purely physical origin and physical constitution of each individual human being – supported by the theory of evolution by natural selection – suggest there is no explanation for the origins of an immaterial mind.
  - Evidence for the neural dependence of all mental phenomena (eg the effects of drugs and brain damage, MRI scans of the brain) is best explained by supposing that minds are brains (or at least that any mind that existed is likely to be physical).
  - Successful reductions in the history of science (eg sound to compression waves of air), give us (inductive) reason to believe that an equivalent reduction is possible for minds to brains.
  - Ockham’s razor: physicalism is to be preferred over dualism as it requires fewer entities so long as it explains the phenomena (at least) as well as dualism (see dualist arguments).

- There may also be sceptical responses to dualist arguments which nevertheless acknowledge the (possibility inherent) limitations of physicalist accounts: eg we may not have (or ever have) the theoretical/conceptual apparatus needed to understand/carry out a naturalistic reduction of the mind to the brain but this does not show that it is not reducible in such a way (McGinn's epistemological pessimism).
- The Lewis/Armstrong argument: that mental concepts like *pain* are concepts like *gene*. We identify what 'gene' refers to by identifying the occupant of the relevant causal role; so too with 'pain' which, given physicalism, will be a physical state of the brain.

**Notes:**

Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments. Persistent misattribution of arguments would certainly be a reason for not awarding a response full marks (it is a deficit in knowledge/accuracy), but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band assuming that the relevant level descriptors have in general been met.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.