



A-level PHILOSOPHY 7172/1

Paper 1 Epistemology and moral philosophy

Mark scheme

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Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits. When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A – Epistemology

0 1 What is the difference between direct realism and indirect realism?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

According to direct realism, the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties: ie we perceive mind-independent objects directly without any mediation (by sense-data).

According to indirect realism, the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects. For indirect realists, we perceive mind-independent physical objects indirectly by directly perceiving (or being aware of) sense data, which represent (or misrepresent) the mind-independent physical objects which cause our perceptions. The sense-data thereby mediate the perception.

The difference between direct and indirect realism can therefore be expressed in terms of:

- Epistemological difference: perceptual immediacy vs perceptual mediation/representation.
- Ontological difference: the non-existence vs the existence of sense-data.

Examples for 3 marks

Some students may express explicitly the difference between direct realism and indirect realism (example 1). However, students can still gain 3 marks if they do not express it explicitly but it is clear from their response that they understand the difference through their explanations of both theories (example 2). The importance is that they understand both theories so the difference may be implicit.

- Example 1: 'The difference between direct realism and indirect realism is that direct realists claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects (and their properties), whereas indirect realists claim the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (and their properties) that are caused by (and represent) mind-independent objects.'
- Example 2: 'Direct realists claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects (and their properties). Indirect realists claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (and their properties) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.'

Examples for 2 marks

Answers that gain 2 marks will typically demonstrate a clear understanding of one of the theories and a partial or less precise understanding of the other theory.

- Example 1: 'Direct realists claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects (and their properties) whereas indirect realists claim that the objects of perception are sense-data.'
- Example 2: 'Direct realists claim that we see the world directly as it is whereas indirect realists claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.'

Examples for 1 mark

Answers that gain 1 mark might be clear on one of the theories (example 1) only or demonstrate a partial or imprecise understanding of both theories (example 2).

- Example 1: 'Direct realists claim that we perceive mind-dependent objects directly whereas indirect realists claim that we perceive mind-independent objects indirectly via the medium of sense-data.'
- Example 2: 'Direct realists claim that we see the world exactly as it is whereas indirect realists claim that we see sense-data.'

Notes:

In elaborating on the difference between direct and indirect realism, students may distinguish perceptual/epistemological immediacy/directness from temporal immediacy/directness. Students are not expected to do this, but it should not count as imprecision/redundancy if they do.

In explaining the difference between direct and indirect realism, students may characterise sense-data as being private (whereas physical objects are public), mind-dependent – they cannot exist unperceived (whereas physical objects are mind-independent) and having exactly the properties they appear to have (they are exactly as they seem) and so I cannot be wrong about my sense-data (whereas I can make mistakes about physical objects).

Students may also mention that indirect realism typically relies on the arguments from illusion, hallucination, variation, and time-lag, but students cannot be expected to give any of those arguments, which are not within the scope of this question, although it should not count as imprecision or redundancy if they do.

Similarly, students may mention that indirect realism relies on the phenomenal principle (if something appears to be *f* there must be something that is *f*) but they are not expected to, although it should not count as imprecision/redundancy if they do.

Students who characterise direct realism simply in terms of naïve realism - ie as the claim that 'what you see is what you get' - are guilty of imprecision as this would make non-veridical perceptions impossible by definition, which is not a position endorsed by direct realism.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 2 Explain Locke’s distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

John Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities in Book II Chapter 8 of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Some further points about our simple ideas*.

- A ‘quality’ is ‘the power to produce an idea in our mind’. (II.8.8)
- ‘Primary qualities’ are ‘utterly inseparable from a body, whatever state it is in. Qualities of this kind are the ones that a body doesn’t lose, however much it alters, whatever force it used on it, however finely it is divided’. (II.8.9)
 - Examples include: extension, shape, mobility (motion and rest), and number.
- ‘Secondary qualities’ are ‘really nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities’. (II.8.10)
 - Examples include colours, smell, sound, and taste.

Expect students to mention one or more of the differences below.

- Primary qualities are intrinsic/inherent properties (properties something has in virtue of how it is regardless of how anything else is) and therefore mind-independent properties (as they are what they are irrespective of how they are related to any minds). Secondary qualities are dispositional qualities (powers), relational properties (properties something has in virtue of its relation to other things) and mind-dependent properties (properties something has in virtue of its relation to our minds).
- Our ideas of the primary qualities of bodies resemble them. Our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble them.
- Primary qualities are measurable. Secondary qualities are not measurable.
- Primary qualities can be detected by more than one sense (eg sight and touch). Secondary qualities cannot be detected by more than one sense.
- Primary qualities are not caused by/grounded in secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are (partly) caused by/grounded in primary qualities.

Students might explain the distinction by drawing on some of Locke’s own examples.

- Locke draws an analogy with the secondary qualities of heat and pain to show how secondary qualities are not mind-independent.

- Locke points out that the colour of porphyry vanishes when the light goes down despite no ‘real’ alteration being made to it. This suggests that colour isn’t an inherent quality. He gives a similar example with grinding up an almond.
- Locke gives the example of water that is felt to be both hot (to one hand) and cold (to another hand). The explanation is that warmth and cold are not mind-independent qualities of an object but mind-dependent qualities which depend on the mind of a perceiver.
- Locke distinguishes the mind-dependent secondary qualities of heat (feeling hot and cold) from the mind-independent primary quality of shapes (being square/spherical): ‘For, if we imagine warmth, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other (which shape never does; something never feels square to one hand and spherical to the other)’.

Some students may choose one key distinction and develop this in detail, whereas others may choose to mention more than one key distinction and develop each in less detail. Both approaches are acceptable if the distinction is clearly explained.

Notes:

The precise interpretation of Locke’s account of secondary qualities is debatable. Locke claims that secondary qualities are qualities of mind-independent objects and so these ‘powers to produce sensations in us’ should be not be identified with ‘the sensations they produce’. However, Locke at times suggests that secondary qualities ‘are all in the mind’ (eg when he draws a parallel with secondary qualities and pain), so that it is hard to see if Locke is really committed to secondary qualities being ‘the power to produce sensations in us’ rather than ‘the sensations they produce’.

Responses which suggest that secondary qualities ‘are all in the mind’ or identify secondary qualities with the sensations they produce should not be unduly penalised if they explain the distinction in this way. It may be that some high-quality responses reflectively point out these issues of interpretation, although there is no expectation for students to do so.

Students who explain the distinction clearly but who get the terms the wrong way round – eg by ascribing the characteristics of primary qualities to secondary qualities and vice versa – can gain a maximum of 3 marks. If their ascriptions are consistently misattributed, then the substantive content will be present but it will be imprecise.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 3 Explain Hume’s Fork.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Hume’s Fork is Hume’s distinction between ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’.

Relations of ideas

- ‘Can be discovered purely by thinking with no need to attend to anything that actually exists anywhere in the universe.’
- Are demonstratively/intuitively certain/self-evident.
- Cannot be denied without contradiction.
- Examples include the propositions ‘*the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides*’ and ‘*three times five equals half of thirty*’.

Matters of fact

- Must be established empirically and cannot be discovered purely by thinking but only by attending to what actually exists in the universe.
- Are neither demonstrative nor certain.
- Can be denied without contradiction.
- All reasoning concerning matters of fact which is not based on ‘our present senses or the records of our memory’ relies on the (problematic) relation of cause and effect.
- Examples include the proposition ‘*the sun will not rise tomorrow*’.

Students may express Hume’s Fork as being exhaustive: if a claim does not express a relation of ideas or a matter of fact, then the claim in question is not knowledge (and, in Hume’s phrase, ‘should be committed to the flames as it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion!’)

Students may express Hume’s Fork in terms of a mutually exclusive distinction between analytic, a priori propositions of necessary truths, on the one hand, and synthetic, a posteriori propositions of contingent truths, on the other. As such, there can be no synthetic a priori knowledge. It is fine for students to express the distinction in this way.

Students may contextualise Hume’s Fork as being part of a wider ‘empiricism vs rationalism’ debate and explain how ‘the Fork’, by denying the possibility of synthetic, a priori knowledge is an expression of empiricism and a denial of rationalism.

Notes:

Students who explain the distinction clearly but who get the terms the wrong way round – eg by ascribing the characteristics of relations of ideas to matters of fact and vice versa – can gain a maximum of 3 marks. If their ascriptions are consistently misattributed, then the substantive content will be present but it will be imprecise.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 4 Explain **one** of Gettier’s original counter examples **and** explain how the addition of a ‘no false lemmas’ condition responds to it.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Explain one of Gettier's original counter examples...

Students may outline ‘the tripartite view’ as part of their response though they need not do so as long as it is clear from their response that they know what it is.

- The tripartite view is the position that the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a subject (S) to know a proposition (P) are that: 1) P is true, 2) S believes that P, and 3) S is justified in believing that P.
- The tripartite view may be identified as the ‘JTB’ account.
- Since the tripartite view is commonly abbreviated in textbooks, students should not be penalised if they write it down in shorthand as long as it is clear from their response that they know what the tripartite view is.
- Gettier’s first objection shows that the conditions of the tripartite account are not jointly sufficient by giving the counter example of Smith and Jones applying for a job. Smith is justified in believing proposition (i) and (ii):
 - (i) ‘Jones will get the job’
 - (ii) ‘Jones has 10 coins in his pocket’.

- From propositions (i) and (ii) Smith infers the proposition:
 - (iii) ‘The man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job’.
 - Since propositions (i) and (ii) are justified, and since proposition (iii) is justifiably inferred from propositions (i) and (ii), proposition (iii) is also a justified belief.
 - The Gettier twist: For some reason it is actually Smith, not Jones, who gets the job and Smith also happens to have 10 coins in his pocket. Proposition (iii) is therefore a *true* justified belief. However, despite proposition (iii) fulfilling the conditions of the tripartite account it is not an example of knowledge but rather a case of ‘epistemic luck’.
- Gettier’s second objection shows that the conditions of the tripartite account are not jointly sufficient by giving the counter example of Smith, Jones, and Brown.
 - Smith is justified in believing the proposition (iv) ‘Jones owns a Ford’ and therefore, logically speaking, justified in believing any disjunctive proposition which follows from that proposition.
 - Smith is therefore also justified in believing the proposition: (v) ‘Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona,’ despite not being justified in the second disjunct (‘Brown is in Barcelona’).
 - The Gettier Twist: for some reason Jones does not actually own a Ford but Brown just happens to be in Barcelona. Proposition (v) is therefore also true. However, despite the fact that proposition (v) is a true, justified belief and satisfies the tripartite view it is not an example of knowledge but a case of ‘epistemic luck.’

...and explain how the addition of a ‘no false lemmas’ condition responds to it

- The ‘no false lemmas’ account adds a fourth necessary condition to the tripartite account: 4) That S’s justification for believing that P does not contain any false lemmas. With the addition of this condition there are, on this account, four conditions which are jointly sufficient for knowledge.
- A ‘lemma’ is here a ‘belief’ that S relies on in his justification for believing the proposition P. Students may characterise the lemma as a ‘premise’ or a ‘reason’ on which S relies to validly infer the proposition P.
- The ‘no false lemmas’ account responds to the first Gettier case by pointing out that (i) is a false lemma, and that (iii) therefore doesn’t amount to knowledge.
- The ‘no false lemmas’ account responds to the second Gettier case by pointing out that (iv) is a false lemma, and that (v) therefore doesn’t amount to knowledge.
- Students must ensure that they do not conflate the ‘no false lemmas’ account with any version of infallibilism. The point is that the presence of a false lemma rules out that S knows that P. The point is not that one of the lemmas could have been false and that S therefore doesn’t know that P.
- Similarly, students must ensure that they do not conflate ‘false lemma’ with ‘unjustified lemma’. In the examples, the lemma is justified despite being false.

Notes:

Students are asked to respond to one of *Gettier’s* objections and it is therefore expected that students respond to one of Gettier’s own two examples. Students who give a different example cannot expect to be put in the top band as it demonstrates insufficient knowledge of the anthology text. However, students who do not use one of Gettier’s original counter examples (eg Henry in Barn County) can still access the 7-9 band if their chosen example is clearly explained, linked to the sufficiency issue and they explain how the addition of a ‘no false lemmas’ condition addresses the sufficiency issue: if done well, this would demonstrate the skill of logical integration. Additionally, what is important is that students explain the logic of Gettier’s examples and so the names and fictional details of the two stories are not important.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 5 Are the claims of philosophical scepticism true?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

When explaining philosophical scepticism students are likely to make reference to one or more of the following:

- Students may want to define philosophical scepticism (eg the claim that our usual methods of justification for claiming that our beliefs amount to knowledge – eg perception or inductive reason – are, contrary to what we normally assume, inadequate).
- Students may want to distinguish philosophical scepticism from normal incredulity.
- Students may want to distinguish global and local scepticism. Global scepticism can be understood either (narrowly) as external-world scepticism or as (more broadly) scepticism in the Academic tradition of inviting a suspension of knowledge claims regardless of subject-matter including knowledge of one’s own states of mind (knowledge based on introspection) and a priori claims (eg mathematical claims such as $2+2=4$).

Typical examples of philosophical scepticism will include:

- having any knowledge whatsoever (Descartes’ evil demon scenario)
- knowledge of the existence of the external world (Descartes’ dream argument)
- problems of other minds
- moral knowledge
- knowledge of the existence of God
- knowledge of ‘the self’
- knowledge of the future
- knowledge of causal relations.

There are numerous sceptical scenarios and arguments to be found in the anthology texts which students can outline to argue in favour of philosophical scepticism. Eg:

- Descartes’ three waves of doubt as outlined in *The Meditations*:
 - 1st Wave of Doubt: The Argument from illusion/perceptual error
 - 2nd Wave of Doubt: The Argument from dreaming
 - 3rd Wave of Doubt: The Evil Demon Scenario
- The problems of the *existence* of mind-independent objects which indirect realism in general faces (including Berkeley’s challenge to the primary/secondary quality distinction and his ‘Master’ Argument).
- The problems of the *nature* of mind-independent objects which indirect realism faces (including Berkeley’s argument that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects).
- Russell’s arguments in *The Problems of Philosophy* that the existence and nature of physical objects must be inferred.

Students may also draw on material from outside the specification and the anthology text. Eg:

- Ancient Greek Scepticism (including Pyrrhonism)
- The brain in a vat scenario and similar 'Matrix' type scenarios
- The problem of causation (Hume)
- The problem of induction (Hume)
- New riddle of induction (Nelson Goodman)

The overarching positions adopted will be among the following:

- YES: the claims of philosophical scepticism are true
- NO: the claims of philosophical scepticism are not true.

Students who draw the distinction between global and local philosophical scepticism could argue:

- YES: the claims of both global philosophical scepticism and of local philosophical scepticism are true
- NO: the claims of global philosophical scepticism are not true, but, yes, the claims of (particular kinds of) local philosophical scepticism are true
- NO: the claims of neither global philosophical scepticism nor local philosophical scepticism are true.

No, the claims of philosophical scepticism are not true because:

- Descartes successfully overcomes his three waves of doubt by applying intuition and deduction to prove, via proofs of God's existence, the capacity of his mind to have knowledge (in particular knowledge of the external world but also a priori knowledge)
- Locke successfully argues to the existence of the external world from the fact that our experiences are involuntary
- Locke and Trotter Cockburn successfully argue to the existence of the external world from the coherence of various kinds of experience – ie that can be verified by more than one sense-experience (eg touch and sight)
- Berkeley's idealist response, albeit anti-realist, adequately overcomes scepticism: we can infer God as an ontological and epistemological guarantor
- Although he doesn't give a deductive proof, Russell successfully infers the existence of physical objects as the best hypothesis for the coherence and consistency of our sense-data
- Reliabilist responses to scepticism (eg Alvin Goldman's argument that whilst the sceptic is right to point out that we cannot give 'the verification conditions' for knowledge, we can nevertheless give the 'truth conditions' for knowledge, which shows that knowledge is possible although we might not know that we possess it).

Students may also draw on material from outside the specification and the anthology text. Eg:

- the problem of induction is not a genuine problem outside of the philosopher's study and can therefore be mitigated (Hume)
- reason relies on induction wherefore we cannot reasonably undermine it so the problem of induction isn't a genuine problem at all (A J Ayer)
- transcendental idealism as a partial response to scepticism: Kant shows that although we cannot have any knowledge about the noumenal world we can nevertheless have synthetic a priori knowledge about objects in the phenomenal world (eg that they are causally connected)
- Kant's claims to have solved 'the problem of the external world' with his refutation of idealism
- Gilbert Ryle's responses to both global and local Cartesian scepticism
- G.E. Moore's response to scepticism is successful (various interpretations of Moore's response to scepticism are available)

- Wittgenstein successfully argues that scepticism is somehow incoherent or self-defeating (eg via his ‘private language’ argument or through the considerations that make up *On Certainty* about doubt requiring a context to be meaningful)
- post-Kantian transcendental responses to scepticism (eg P. F. Strawson)
- post-Wittgensteinian contextualist responses to scepticism (eg Michael Williams’s arguments in *Groundless Beliefs* and *Unnatural Doubts*)
- semantic anti-sceptical arguments which follows from (Putnam’s) semantic externalism successfully refute philosophical scepticism.

Yes, the claims of philosophical scepticism are true because:

- Descartes’ doesn’t successfully overcome his own methodological scepticism (eg because of the Cartesian circle and/or because Descartes fails to prove the existence of God)
- Locke’s arguments are not successful (eg because they beg the question against sceptical scenarios)
- Locke and Trotter Cockburn’s argument is not successful (eg because systematic order and coherence in perception does not necessarily imply a mind-independent object as the cause)
- Berkeley’s idealism is not satisfactory (eg because it is a kind of scepticism and therefore doesn’t overcome it eg because the role God plays in Berkeley’s system is problematic)
- Russell’s inference is not the best explanation
- Reliabilism fails to refute scepticism since we cannot draw a rigid distinction between ‘truth-conditions’ and ‘verification-conditions’ of knowledge (eg Bonjour’s general criticism of why any externalist, reliabilist account fails).

Students may also draw on material from outside the specification and the anthology text. Eg:

- Kant’s transcendental idealism is not satisfactory (eg because it is a kind of scepticism and therefore doesn’t overcome it)
- Hume and Ayer fail to overcome the problem of induction
- Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ is not successful
- Contextualist responses are not satisfactory as they in fact concede scepticism rather than give a response to it.

Any combination of the points above.

Notes:

Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make). Persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be an imprecision that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming the response generally meets the requirements of the relevant level descriptors).

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

Section B – Moral philosophy

0 6 What is the difference between moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Moral naturalism argues that moral properties are natural/physical properties whereas moral non-naturalism argues that moral properties are non-natural/non-physical.
 - Students may go on to explain what is meant by ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’. Typically, a ‘natural property’ is one that can be investigated by one of the natural sciences whereas a non-natural property cannot. Students may use the term *sui generis* (unique) when referring to non-natural properties.
- The difference can also be expressed in terms of moral claims or moral judgements: eg moral naturalism argues that moral claims/judgements are made true or false by virtue of natural/physical moral properties whereas moral non-naturalism denies it.
- The difference can also be expressed in terms of reducibility: eg moral naturalism claims that moral properties are reducible to natural properties whereas moral non-naturalism denies this.
- The difference can also be expressed epistemologically: eg moral naturalists argue that moral facts are known *a posteriori* through observation/experience whereas moral non-naturalists argue that moral facts are known *a priori* – eg through intuition.

Examples for 3 marks

Some students may express explicitly the difference between moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism (example 1). However, students can still gain 3 marks if they do not express it explicitly but it is clear from their response that they understand the difference through their explanations of both theories (example 2). The importance is that they understand both theories, so the difference may be implicit.

- Example 1: ‘The difference between moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism is that moral naturalists claim that moral properties exist and are natural properties whereas moral non-naturalists claim that moral properties exist but they are non-natural properties.’
- Example 2: ‘Moral naturalists claim that moral properties exist and are natural properties. Moral non-naturalists claim that moral properties exist and are non-natural properties.’

Examples for 2 marks

Answers that gain 2 marks will typically demonstrate a clear understanding of one of the theories and a partial or less precise understanding of the other theory.

- Example 1: 'Moral naturalists claim that moral properties exist and are natural properties whereas moral non-naturalists claim that moral properties exist but they can't be seen'.
- Example 2: 'Moral naturalists claim that there are natural properties like happiness whereas moral non-naturalists claim that moral properties exist but are non-natural.'

Examples for 1 mark

Answers that gain 1 mark might be clear on one of the theories only (example 1) or demonstrate a partial or imprecise understanding of both theories (example 2).

- Example 1: 'Moral naturalists claim that moral properties are natural properties whereas moral non-naturalists claim that moral properties do not exist'.
- Example 2: 'Moral naturalists claim that there are natural properties like happiness whereas moral non-naturalists claim that there are non-natural properties that are known in a different way'.

Notes:

Some students may express the difference in terms of 'supervenience'. Moral naturalism claims that moral properties supervene on natural/physical properties whereas moral non-naturalism denies it.

Both moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism may be characterised as forms of 'moral realism'. Students should not be penalised for pointing out this similarity as long as they are clear on what the difference between the two positions is.

Examples of the two theories and their advocates are not asked for or required, but if they are given accurately then that is perfectly acceptable. However, examples alone are insufficient to gain marks and must be accompanied by an explanation of the relevant theories: no marks can be awarded for an answer that simply states, for example, that utilitarianism is a naturalist theory whereas intuitionism is a non-naturalist theory as this does not address the question.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 7 Explain the difference between Bentham’s **quantitative** hedonistic utilitarianism and Mill’s **qualitative** hedonistic utilitarianism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students are likely to characterise ‘utilitarianism’ and/or ‘hedonistic utilitarianism’ before explaining how Bentham’s and Mill’s versions differ.

Utilitarianism

- Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism according to which it is the consequences of actions that give them their moral worth (this may be distinguished from Kantian deontology).

Hedonistic utilitarianism

- Hedonism: The only thing that is ‘good’ is ‘happiness’ understood in terms of pleasure and absence of pain. Other things derive their value from either bringing about happiness as instrumental means or as constitutive parts of happiness.
 - Psychological hedonism: It is only the pursuit of ‘happiness,’ understood in terms of pleasure and absence of pain, which is able to motivate us to act.
 - Normative hedonism: an action is morally good and ought to be done insofar as it contributes to the greatest amount of happiness, understood in terms of pleasure and absence of pain, for the greatest amount of people.

Difference

- Mill draws a distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower pleasures’ (qualitative hedonism) whereas the only difference for Bentham is the amount of pleasure (quantitative hedonism). Bentham does not (as Mill does) see there as being any morally important difference between types of pleasure. He does not make any qualitative distinctions between pleasure based on its type, its origin or indeed what the pleasure is being taken in.
- Some students may develop their account of Bentham’s quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism by explaining the felicific/hedonic calculus. They may point out that Mill does not rely on the calculus.
- Students may elaborate on Mill’s distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures.
 - Higher pleasures may be characterised as pleasures involving a cognitive element (eg taking pleasure in poetry, arts, sciences, philosophy, literature, music etc), or as a pleasure that

humans are capable of having qua our human nature (eg taking pleasure in recognition qua our sociable nature).

- Lower pleasures may be characterised as ‘sensual’ pleasures/gratifications, which, at least to some extent, are shared with (other) animals (such as taking pleasure in eating and drinking).
- Students may refer to ‘the competent judge,’ in accounting for this distinction between higher and lower pleasures, and argue that the fact that some judges are more competent than others is another inherent difference between Mill and Bentham.
- Students may suggest that higher- and lower-order pleasures are incommensurable in the sense that a higher-order pleasure is of incomparably more value than a lower-order pleasure (ie a higher-order pleasure is one that should not be exchanged for any amount of lower-order pleasures).

When drawing the distinction between qualitative and quantitative hedonism students may also elaborate on the difference between Bentham and Mill’s moral decision-making process.

- Bentham suggests that the felicific/hedonic calculus gets applied on a case-by-case basis (act-utilitarianism).
- Mill advocates that we follow our normal, ‘conventional’, moral rules of thumbs (eg ‘don’t steal’, ‘don’t lie’, ‘don’t break promises’, ‘don’t murder’) in our everyday decision making. These rules have evolved over centuries to promote the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people and are therefore ‘utilitarian rules’ to be followed.
 - Mill calls these moral rules for ‘secondary principles’.
 - It is only when the ‘secondary principles’ conflict that we need to consider the case separately.
 - Since the ‘secondary principles’ are only ‘secondary’ and always revisable in light of individual acts, it is problematic to call Mill a ‘rule-utilitarian’, but students should not be penalised if they do as long as their account of the ‘secondary principles’ is clear.

Notes:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate

0 8 Explain Hare’s prescriptivism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Hare’s prescriptivism can be seen as a response to the challenge of logical positivism and the verification principle.

Students may make some of the following points.

- According to Hare’s prescriptivism, ethical utterances express non-cognitive attitudes.
 - Ethical statements do not make, or at least do not only make, descriptive claims about reality which are true or false (fact-stating).
 - Hare allows that ethical language can have a descriptive meaning despite ethical claims being non-cognitive (eg when we say that something is ‘good’ we are appealing to a background set of standards about what makes something good, and this can be subject to rational constraints).
 - When people are making ethical utterances they are not (or not merely) expressing states of mind either. Nor are they merely reporting beliefs about their states of minds.

- According to Hare’s prescriptivism, ethical utterances are/imply imperatives prescribing how anyone should behave.
 - Prescriptivism connects ethical language to its use (nothing about the facts can entail any particular moral judgement).
 - Ethical utterances are/imply imperatives prescribing how anyone should behave.
 - According to Hare, once a standard has been chosen by someone it must be applied universally to all relevantly similar agents/context/actions. Moral prescriptions are universalisable by the utterer. In this sense, moral utterances can be related logically to each other.
 - According to Hare, ethical utterances are meaningful, not because they state facts, but because they are/imply imperatives prescribing actions, and because they can be logically related to past utterances.

Notes:

Some students may explain that Hare is a moral anti-realist, and this is credit worthy, although there is no requirement for them to do so to achieve full marks.

Some students may explain that Hare claims that ethical utterances can be commending – eg the word ‘good’ is used to commend – as well as commanding – eg the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.

Students may use contrasts with emotivism to try and explain prescriptivism. This is appropriate (not redundant) as long as references to emotivism are used to explain prescriptivism.

Some students may explain that by specifying that imperatives prescribing actions can be logically related to each other, Hare’s prescriptivism overcomes the ‘Frege-Geach problem’.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate

0 9 Explain how Kant’s deontological approach to ethics might be applied to the issue of stealing. **[12 marks]**

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Kant’s deontological approach

Kant’s view may be distinguished from other moral theories. Kant does not base morality on consequences (unlike utilitarianism) and does not base morality on dispositions/character/nature (unlike virtue ethics).

An account of Kant’s deontological approach will mention all or some of the some of the following points:

- Kant argues that we have duties to do (or not do) certain things which are right (or wrong) in themselves.
- Kant argues that our moral duties are discoverable by reason and that only those who possess adequate rational capacities have such duties.
- Only the good will is good without qualification and to have a good will is to do your duty because it is your duty (other motivations are irrelevant). Students may develop this point with the ‘shopkeepers’ example and draw a distinction between actions done ‘in accordance with duty’ and ‘from duty’.
- Moral duties are categorical and not hypothetical, because they are your duty regardless of what you want. These duties are not a means to a further end.

- Categorical imperatives are (most readily) derivable from the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”.
 - Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test is morally wrong.
 - A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it.
 - Students may mention the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, distinguished by whether a failure is constituted by a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will.
- The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Humanity): “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end”.

Students may answer the question of stealing with reference to either the first formulation, or the second formulation, or both formulations.

Kant’s view on stealing in terms of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative

- Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test is morally wrong.
- A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it.
 - This may be referred to as a ‘contradiction in conception’.
- In the case of stealing, Kant would argue that your maxim would be ‘I can steal, if it gets me the property I want’.
- If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say, ‘All rational agents must, by a universal law of nature, steal when it gets them the property they want’.
- Stealing presupposes the concept of ‘property’ (or ‘property rights’) but, in this world, where anyone can take whatever they want, the concept of ‘property’ (or ‘property rights’) doesn’t exist.
- So, my maxim cannot exist with itself as a universal law.
- Thus, we have a (perfect) duty to not steal.

Kant’s view on stealing in relation to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative

- In the case of stealing, to steal something from someone is to treat them merely as a means to your own ends, rather than as an end.
- Stealing undermines the power and autonomy of others to keep the property they are entitled to or to freely choose to give their property away.

Notes:

Students may explain Kant’s distinction between acting out of duty and acting in accordance with duty as part of their response.

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

1 0 To what extent can Aristotelian virtue ethics be defended?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.</p> <p>Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument.</p> <p>There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.</p> <p>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.</p> <p>There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

When explaining Aristotle’s virtue ethics students are likely to make reference to one or more of the following

- Aristotle’s ethical view, in general, is based around the development of good moral character: it is agent centred rather than act centred.
- Aristotle’s ethics are centred around the concept of eudaimonia, ‘living well and doing well’. For Aristotle, the term encompasses not only a moral sense of goodness, but it also denotes success (material wealth, status, achievements, high offices held within the city-state).
- Eudaimonia is ‘an end in itself’. It is an intrinsic good as opposed to an instrumental good.
- As an intrinsic good, eudaimonia is desirable for its own sake rather than for the sake of something else.
- However, since there are many activities and goods which are ends in themselves, eudaimonia stands out as the highest of those ends and is the ultimate or final end. As the final/ultimate end, eudaimonia is ‘self-sufficient’.
- The ‘self-sufficiency’ of eudaimonia, however, does not entail that a person who lives the life of eudaimonia is self-sufficient. People are by nature social and ‘political’ in the sense that we live in societies, wherefore our eudaimonia depends on the eudaimonia of our family, friends, and fellow citizens. Friends and citizens are ‘our other selves’. Individuals are parts of greater wholes (families, friends, the wider citizenry) and defined as part of those wholes.
- Eudaimonia is also to be understood in terms of a whole well-lived life. It is not a psychological or biological state a person can possess piecemeal or periodically.
- Aristotle defines eudaimonia in terms of fulfilling one’s biological, psychological, and societal capabilities/roles/functions (ergon) well, and to do so from a ‘settled disposition’ of an ‘excellence of character’ (or virtuous character).
- Excellence/virtue is to be cultivated through reflective practice as a skill (techne).
- Aristotle’s account of virtues and vices:
 - virtues as character traits/dispositions
 - the role of education/habituation in the development of moral character (perhaps including reference to the state and to family/role-models)
 - the doctrine of the mean
 - the relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/practical wisdom.
- Part of eudaimonia – living well and doing well – is that the person learns to take pleasure in the right things. Since the ‘eudaimon’ person chooses to do the right thing from a settled disposition of excellence/virtue, eudaimonia will entail living a pleasant life, but it will not be a life lived for the sake of pleasure.
- Because Aristotle defines eudaimonia in terms of fulfilling one’s capabilities/roles/function (ergon), eudaimonia is sometimes translated as ‘flourishing’.
- Because Aristotle also understands eudaimonia in terms of a pleasant life, eudaimonia is sometimes translated as ‘happiness’ on the assumption that pleasure brings about happiness.
- In Book 10 Aristotle defines eudaimonia as living a life of contemplation.

- There is a scholarly debate as to whether eudaimonia as ‘the ultimate/final end’ is to be construed as a ‘dominant end’ or an ‘inclusive end’. The dominant end reading suggests that eudaimonia mainly consist of one single activity: contemplation. The inclusive end reading suggests that eudaimonia is composed out of many excellent/virtuous activities guided by practical wisdom (phronesis).
- It is likely that students will focus primarily on Aristotle, but the word ‘Aristotelian’ in the question allows for the whole essay to be focused on those writing in the virtue ethics tradition. If the student does this, there is no problem with this.
- It is possible that students may decide to focus quite specifically and in detail on certain of these features of Aristotle’s theory, perhaps because their preferred lines of argument relate specifically to them (eg that in emphasising the importance of education/habituation Aristotle leaves too much to chance in the development of good character).
- Some students may mention that Aristotelian virtue ethics can be situated in metaethical discussions as an example of moral realism and ethical naturalism: the truths of ethics are derived from (or reducible/identical to) facts about human nature that are discoverable through observation. They may do this in order to then evaluate this approach by applying arguments for or against moral realism and/or ethical naturalism.

The overarching positions adopted will be among the following

- YES: it can be defended – ie the student may support and/or defend an Aristotelian account.
- NO: it cannot be defended – ie the student may argue that it cannot be adequately supported and/or that there are (fatal) issues with the account.
- YES and NO: parts of the theory can be defended but not all of it. This may end up still meaning it is rejected, or alternatively it may be accepted but with some qualification.

Arguments will likely draw from the bullet-pointed lists underneath (though this is not exhaustive)

Support for Aristotelian virtue ethics

- Eudaimonia (whether understood as ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’) is a common (if not universal) aspiration of humankind and therefore an appropriate goal for the moral life.
- Anscombe supports an Aristotelian approach by noting that rigid laws/rules (as in Kantian deontological ethics) do not make sense in the absence of a law/rule-giver (eg God). Moral philosophers should therefore focus on the happiness/flourishing of a human life with all its dimensions working in harmony (holism).
- In the light of all that we know about the human species (eg through evolutionary biology and anthropology) human beings are still best understood in Aristotelian terms: eg as ‘rational animals’ (eg Geach). Students may therefore defend Aristotelian virtue ethics through the function argument, based as it is on this reputedly essential characteristic of human nature (ie rationality).
- Students may qualify the latter with an acknowledgment that our modern understanding of human biology and psychology make Aristotle’s own views on women and slaves indefensible today, but his insights into the nature of ‘man’ can and should be expanded to be inclusive of all human beings and (possibly) some non-human animals (eg MacIntyre).
- Students may argue that the importance of education and habituation in the cultivation of excellence/virtue is empirically demonstrable (in those we admire as moral exemplars); by contrast, we do not (typically) attribute admirable moral decisions to the application of abstract universal principles or speculative consequential calculations. Furthermore, we recognise the truth that we are not born moral – so, no one is evil by nature.
- The ‘doctrine of the mean’ – properly understood to mean registering the appropriate feeling/emotion, at the appropriate time, motivating the appropriate action – is applicable to practical moral education with the potential to develop moral character throughout a lifetime.

- *‘So too anyone can get angry, or give and spend money – these are easy; but doing them in relation to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the right way – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy.’ II.9*
- Some students may argue that virtue ethics rightly places greater emphasis on how moral agents feel about their morally good action – eg commending those who take pleasure in acting for the good of others rather than seeing this as a form of self-interest without moral worth.
- Some students may give a defence of Aristotle from a metaethical standpoint: it is the most defensible account of ethics as it is the most defensible account of moral cognitivism and naturalism.

Criticism of Aristotelian virtue ethics

- Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act: the doctrine of the mean is too vague (given that it depends on the person, the circumstance, and seems unmeasurable).
- The issue of clashing/competing virtues (eg how kindness in certain situations can clash with courage).
- The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other: virtuous acts defined as ‘acts performed by a virtuous person’ and ‘virtuous person’ defined as ‘a person who performs/is disposed to perform virtuous acts’.
- The relationship between the good for the individual and (wider) moral good: Must a trait really contribute to eudaimonia in order to be a virtue? There may be virtues relating to our treatment of the environment and wider society which do not contribute to our eudaimonia.
- Aristotle’s account of ethics leaves too much down to luck (and yet, perhaps in tension with this, Aristotle holds people responsible for their ignorance of virtue).
- The application of Mackie’s argument from relativity: If there are moral facts (eg about the virtues), then why is there not more agreement about them?
- Objections to the function argument.
 - Humans do not have a function: there cannot be a function without a function-giver (Sartre’s point that, without God, ‘existence precedes essence’).
 - Even if something is our unique function this does not imply that we should fulfil it – this could be linked to Hume’s is-ought gap.
 - (Some) animals share the functions that Aristotle sees as uniquely human (reasoning, deliberation, language). Aristotle wrongly excludes animals from moral consideration and contribution.
 - There are other unique human functions (some being morally suspect/bad) which are ignored in Aristotle’s account.
- Application of Moore’s ‘open question argument’ to insist that goodness (of a person) cannot be reduced to the possession of certain virtues.
- A Kantian criticism: eudaimonistic ethics is little more than prudence, which has nothing to do with morality and therefore fails as an ethical theory. The entire framework is wrong.

Notes:

Students are free to advocate one or more rival moral theories (eg Kant’s deontological ethics) over Aristotle’s virtue ethics. They may also critically compare Aristotle’s position with one or more rival moral theories (eg act and rule utilitarianism). But discussion of these alternative theories is only credit worthy to the extent that it is used to analyse and evaluate Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make). Persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be an imprecision that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming the response generally meets the requirements of the relevant level descriptors).

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.